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Abstract 
Neoclassical economic theory dominates the ways in which we frame our problems, our 
policies, and our behavior. I argue this neoclassical framing presents deeply flawed 
understandings of human motivations and wellbeing. I further contend that by relying on 
the metrics and practices of neoclassical economics, we actively impede our pursuit of 
the good life. The same economic theories that misguide the pursuit of wellbeing are also 
destructive to the ways in which we approach the problems of climate change. By 
drawing on a robust body of literature, I establish my own understanding of wellbeing 
and show that the pillars of this wellbeing align with the central goals of 
environmentalism. I ultimately argue that the framework of environmentalism offers us 
an opportunity to turn away from inherently destructive neoclassical practices and 
reshape our conception and pursuit of the good life.  
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Preface 
In my economics courses at Macalester, we begin every model by laying out certain 
assumptions about society and human behavior. We acknowledge that these assumptions 
exist for the sake of simplicity, and allow us to get at the meat of the problem. But as I 
have immersed myself not only in economics but in studies of political theory as well, the 
assumptions underlying neoclassical economics have started to seem less benign. I have 
come to see neoclassical priorities and assumptions as coded political messages that are 
deeply engrained in the ways we conceive of ourselves, our lives, and the things we find 
meaningful.  
Even as I have become more skeptical of neoclassical theory, I have 
simultaneously become convinced that living a good life is deeply intertwined with 
environmental goals. This is not simply because we gain utility from breathing clean air 
or seeing flowers, but because environmentalism challenges us to reshape our behaviors 
and societies, and live in ways that better express our priorities. Yet the ways in which 
neoclassical economics frames the issues of environmentalism and wellbeing alienates 
these two pursuits from each other because it can only frame goods or virtues as 
instrumental, and can never fully articulate the inherent worthiness of environmentalism 
or of a good life.  
This study has been an opportunity to settle a long-standing internal contention 
that has marked my intellectual efforts. With it, I aim to understand what aspects of life 
are inherently valuable, articulate the ways in which neoclassicism threatens these aspects 
of life, and offer of a more honest, robust, and well-considered framing of the good life 
and environmentalism. 
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 In completing this project, I am grateful to my parents, Matthew and Ellen 
Dudley, for keeping me grounded and focused when the work seemed overwhelming. I 
would also like to thank my readers, Roopali Phadke and Morgan Adamson, for the 
valuable perspectives they have offered regarding my work. I am especially thankful to 
my peers, Rothin Datta and Reavey Alcott Fike, for their much-needed compassion, 
commentary, and commiseration. Finally, I am deeply grateful to my advisor, David 
Blaney; his generosity with both his time and effort, his incisive understanding of the 
literature, and his thoughtful engagement with my work made this project possible. 
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Introduction 
Neoclassical economic theory dominates the ways in which we frame our problems, our 
policies, and our behavior. This neoclassical framing disregards the diversity of virtues 
and hardships that characterize human life by treating all values as commensurable, 
ignores the social contexts in which values and choices arise, does not acknowledge the 
self-awareness and sensitivity of its own human subject, and makes central to its own 
practice pursuits that are only instrumentally valuable, or hollow of value entirely. These 
weaknesses make themselves known in the use of utility as a measure of value, and, 
subsequently, in revealed preference theory. Neoclassicism further limits itself with its 
assumptions of scarcity and its privileging of growth and the accumulation of wealth as a 
proxy for all other goods. Not only do these limitations severely hamper neoclassical 
economics’ ability to inform decisions, understand human behavior, and guide political 
activity; these limitations actively impede our ability to define and pursue good lives. In 
the same way that neoclassicism distorts its subject’s understanding of herself and her 
wellbeing, neoclassicism distorts the true project of environmentalism by 
mischaracterizing environmentalist goals and the tradeoffs that they imply. Conversely, 
environmentalism offers a powerful opportunity to reexamine what is truly worthy in life 
and to restructure our societies and institutions so that they better advance the pursuit of 
the good life.  
 In the following, I draw on a wide and varied body of literature comprised of 
political philosophy, social theory, economic thought, and environmentally focused texts 
written for a popular audience. Using this eclectic collection, I critique the underlying 
assumptions of neoclassical theory and establish an alternative understanding of 
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wellbeing. This reconstituted conception of the good life is based in an exploration of 
nine basic goods: health, security, harmony with nature, the capacity to pursue life 
projects, friendship, community, leisure, democratic rights, and dignity. I go on to posit 
that environmentalism in its most fundamental form is an effort to change human 
behaviors and social organizations so that they more truthfully reflect aspects of a good 
life. Environmentalism, therefore, is inextricably linked to any sincere pursuit of human 
wellbeing, not just because the health and security of our environments is necessary for 
the health and security of human life but also because environmentalism challenges us to 
reimagine ourselves outside of the narrow and destructive prescriptions of neoclassical 
economics.  
In Section I of this paper I lay out the salient pillars of neoclassical economics 
using William Stanley Jevons as my guide. Specifically, I focus on the neoclassical 
understanding of value, its utilitarian roots, its reliance on a binary metric of human 
wellbeing, and its emphasis on personal preference and willingness to pay as a marker of 
wellbeing involving pain and pleasure. I draw on Jevons because of his useful position 
within economic history. His work is early enough that he explicitly draws on utilitarian 
thought of the day – later neoclassicists do not often explicitly reference these social 
theorist roots. Jevons’ work therefore offers us an opportunity to treat neoclassical 
economic assumptions not as empirical truths or necessary conveniences but as biased 
postulates grounded in specific philosophies. Jevons’ work is also useful because 
although it represents neoclassicism’s roots in social theory, it also resonates quite clearly 
with mainstream economics of today, allowing us an inroad by which to understand the 
basic assumptions and teachings of contemporary theory. 
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 Section II is a critique of neoclassical economic thought, specifically focusing on 
the posited understanding of value, the binary metric of goodness and wellbeing, 
preference theory, and the treatment of wealth. In this critique I draw on the work of 
Amartya Sen, Robert and Edward Skidelsky, Charles Taylor, and David Levine. I take 
issue with neoclassicism’s disregard for the individual’s self awareness and her 
commitment to different and sometimes competing ideals, its ignorance of human 
motivations and values, and its use of one universalizing metric to compare and equate 
the diverse aspects of human functioning. In this section I argue that the neoclassical 
portrait of the human being is both restrictive and abstract, and that representing the 
individual in the way that neoclassical theory does is not only incorrect but damaging to 
the modern individual and her ability to pursue a good life.   
 In Section III I offer my understanding of what the good life is – to do so I again 
draw on Sen, Taylor, Levine, and Skidelsky and Skidelsky in addition to Angus Deaton. 
As each thinker expresses, there is no one ultimate “good” but rather diverse virtues that 
cannot be thought of as commeasurable or summable. Further, the thinkers agree that the 
pursuit of these diverse virtues is itself virtuous and valuable. With this in mind I lay out 
the criteria for the basic goods that comprise a good life and then offer a comprehensive 
description of each of the basic goods listed above. 
 Section IV, the final section of my paper, draws together my critique of 
neoclassicism, my portrait of the good life, and the goals of environmentalism. I argue 
that environmentalism in its purest and most simple form is the altering of human 
behavior to better reflect and pursue human wellbeing. Environmentalism, then, offers us 
an opportunity to reprioritize our goals and re-define our sense of what is good and 
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worthwhile. Further, just as neoclassical economics is damaging to the individual’s 
ability to define herself and her conception of wellbeing, it is damaging to 
environmentalism’s intrinsic value and fundamental project. I therefore argue that by 
challenging neoclassical theory, we reframe the sets of trade-off with which we are 
presented and re-examine the valuable parts of our lives. In so doing we empower the 
entwined pursuits of environmentalism and a good life. 
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I: Jevons and Utilitarianism in Neoclassical Economics 
In order to posit alternatives to neoclassical conceptions of wellbeing, it is imperative that 
we first understand the foundations of neoclassical thought. To this end I use William 
Stanley Jevons’ work The Theory of Political Economy, published in 1871, as a 
touchstone to both understand and critique the foundations of neoclassicism. As one of 
the foundational thinkers of early neoclassical economics, Jevons offers a solid and 
holistic base for understanding the core assumptions of neoclassical economic thought.  
 In the following section I lay out Jevons’ understanding of the origin of value, his 
description of pleasure and pain as metrics for human functioning, his contribution to the 
foundations of revealed preference theory, and his treatment of nations and societies. 
Throughout, I highlight Jevons’ use of utilitarian reasoning. I conclude this section by 
discussing the internal inconsistencies I find within the work and show directions for 
criticism. Specifically, I challenge Jevons’ treatment of nations and societies as 
aggregations of individuals, with no concern for the social context or cultural pressures 
that surround choices. I draw attention to Jevons’ attempt to both provide a neutral and 
truthful portrait of the human subject while explicitly abdicating the task of examining 
human feeling outside pleasure and pain. By noting this tension, I illustrate the 
limitations of utilitarian metrics of human wellbeing. Finally, I note the inconsistency of 
treating wealth as the assumed fundamental pursuit of human activity while 
simultaneously claiming that wealth is only a proxy for the inherently valuable pursuit of 
pleasure, which itself is presented as a generalization of all forms of goodness in a human 
life. By drawing attention to these points of weakness in Jevons’ arguments I establish 
the grounds for a more thorough critique of Jevons and neoclassicism in Section II.  
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Yet how significant is a critique of neoclassical economics in a discussion of 
wellbeing? How much does economic theory really affect our understandings of 
ourselves and the framing of the policy that shapes our political and social lives? I argue 
that the influences of neoclassical economics are not restricted to specific aspects of 
politics and academia; rather, the postulates of neoclassicism have a hegemonic hold on 
the framing of policy and the conception of human behavior in contemporary western 
society. This claim reflects the arguments of Michel Foucault in his collection of lectures 
The Birth of Biopolitics, wherein he contends that neoliberalism constitutes the market as 
a site of veridiction in the political economy.1 Thus in contemporary society, the modern 
individual is judged, condemned, redeemed, and therefore understood in the seemingly 
objective eye of the market. To offer a handful of concrete or pedestrian examples to fix 
the point would be to understate the momentous influence of this mode of thinking.  
But in a critique of neoclassical economics, why turn to the work of Jevons? 
Entire branches of economic thought have emerged since his time, statistical 
methodology has evolved greatly, and theoretical insights have made vast strides in 
broadening and deepening the field of neoclassical economics. Surely the entire field 
cannot be critiqued based on the work of one foundational thinker. This I readily 
concede, yet I still contend that Jevons’ work sketches out the foundational assumptions 
that continue to dominate mainstream economics, and that the limitations I address in 
Jevons’ arguments are present in contemporary economic thought. To illustrate this, I 
offer citations from Gregory Mankiw’s popular textbook Principles of Economics 
alongside Jevons’ arguments. Mankiw’s reiteration of Jevons’ assertions shows that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France 1978-
1979, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picadore, 2008), 33.  
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Jevons’ conceptions of value, utility, and preference ordering remain relevant to any 
discussion of neoclassicism. Further, Jevons does the important work of translating 
utilitarianism into economics by drawing on the work of Jeremy Bentham. Looking at 
this original translation of the arguments of Bentham into formal economic theory makes 
the assumptions and social theory underpinnings of neoclassical economics easier to see.  
 The work of Jevons and his contemporaries caused a foundational shift in the way 
economists view value. Classical economists and their critics contend that the value of an 
object is derived from the labor hours required to produce that object. Most famously, 
Adam Smith and Karl Marx build their work on this conception of value. In this tradition 
labor hours – the chosen unit of labor – are also the chosen unit of value because each 
object is the physical manifestation of the hours it took to make it, and therefore any 
value that can be assigned to the object emerges because of the hours spent to produce it.2 
This standard by which value is measured is objective. Jevons’ work marks a departure: 
he argues that an object’s value comes from how useful it is to the person who consumes 
it, and that labor hours only contribute to value “by varying the degree of utility of the 
commodity through an increase or limitation of supply.”3 For Jevons, and for neoclassical 
economists, value is measured by a subjective standard rather than an objective one.  
Not only is value not tied to labor time, it is also not tied to any inherent quality of 
the object itself. According to the neoclassical school, the usefulness of a thing is entirely 
a function of the consumer’s evaluation of its benefits. “Utility,” Jevons writes, “though a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 On labor theory of value, see Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into The Nature and Causes of 
The Wealth of Nations (New York: The Modern Library, 1776), 47, and Karl Marx, 
Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume One, trans. Ben Fowkes 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1867), 145. 
3 W. Stanley Jevons, The Theory of Political Economy (London: Macmillan and Co., 
Ltd., 1871), 1.2. 
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quality of things, is no inherent quality.”4 Jevons means by this that objects are not useful 
outside of human consumption, and their usefulness is not tied in any way to an inherent 
aspect of the object. An object’s utility, which here means usefulness, is entirely 
quantitative in that it either adds to a person’s wellbeing through their use of it or it does 
not. In simple terms, as Mankiw writes, “utility is an abstract measure of the satisfaction 
or happiness that a consumer receives from a bundle of goods.”5 I say that it is 
quantitative rather than qualitative because there is no acknowledgement of the 
circumstances surrounding the object, the end to which it was used, the particular kind of 
wellbeing that its use affords the consumer, or any number of contextual and qualitative 
details that might contribute to our understanding of the relationship between object and 
consumer. In Jevons’ view of value, we are concerned only with the magnitude of the 
object’s effect on the consumer, and whether the effect is positive or negative – in the 
vernacular of economics, whether it creates utility or disutility. We may therefore say that 
value in the neoclassical tradition is both subjective and quantitative, or, as Mankiw puts 
it, utility is “a person’s subjective measure of wellbeing or satisfaction.”6  
 This binary measure of value – an object’s utility or disutility – is explicitly 
derived from, and utterly analogous to, the utilitarian measurement of the human range of 
emotion and wellbeing as increments of either pleasure or pain. Just as an object gives a 
certain magnitude and intensity of utility or disutility to its consumer, each individual’s 
emotional state at any time can be understood as a certain magnitude and intensity of 
either pleasure or pain. So overlapping are these two ideas that they share vocabulary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Jevons, 3.13. 
5 N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics, 6th Edition (Mason: South Western 
Cengage Learning, 2012), 447. 
6 Mankiw, 581.	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within the utilitarian tradition – utility means both the usefulness of an object and the 
pleasure of an individual, while disutility means both the “un-usefulness” of an object 
and the pain of an individual.  
Jevons embraces this utilitarian conception of human functioning, and uses it as 
the foundation of his economics. He writes, “the theory which follows is entirely based 
on a calculus of pleasure and pain; and the object of Economics is to maximise happiness 
by purchasing pleasure, as it were, at the lowest cost of pain.”7 If we accept that that 
people are fundamentally motivated by pleasure and pain in all regards, then it follows 
that if someone does something of her own will, this activity must have in some way 
added to her pleasure or reduced her pain. Identically, if a person pays for something it is 
evident that that thing, no matter what it was, gives her a utility equal to or greater than 
the amount she paid. Though Jevons does not state the theory of revealed preferences in 
explicit terms, we see its roots in his writing and in the pillars of utilitarianism. Mankiw 
echoes this understanding of value and willingness to pay in his discussion of consumer 
utility maximization.8 
 Utilitarianism, and by extension neoclassical thought, establishes utility and 
disutility as the fundamental expression of human functioning. All emotional states can 
be boiled down to a net magnitude and intensity of either pain or pleasure. Anxiety, fear, 
anger, jealousy, hunger, exhaustion, sexual frustration, boredom, and so on are all classed 
as “pain,” while safety, security, sexual release, satisfaction, camaraderie, fulfillment of 
duty, excitement, relaxation, and so on are all, at base, differing magnitudes and 
intensities of “pleasure.” If pain and pleasure encompass the totality of human experience 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Jevons, 1.29. 
8 Mankiw, 136.	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it follows, as Jevons claims, that the goal of human experience is to maximize pleasure at 
the cost of minimum pain. “I have,” he writes, “no hesitation in accepting the Utilitarian 
theory of morals which does uphold the effect upon the happiness of mankind as the 
criterion of what is right and wrong.”9  The greatest good is pleasure, and the greatest bad 
is pain. This understanding of good and bad, whether applied to human wellbeing in 
utilitarianism or a measure of value in neoclassicism, is rooted in individual wants, needs, 
and priorities. In this polar arrangement of human functioning, goodness, like value, is an 
individual and subjective experience.  
These measures of value and goodness, as individual assessments of personal 
experience, are dependent on the assumption that individuals are discreet, whole, and 
self-contained.10 Because individuals are seen as self-contained, society is not treated as 
anything greater than the sum of its most basic component – the discreet individual. 
Society as a unit is analogous to the individual as a unit. As an aggregation of separate 
individuals, society can be represented by the mathematical expression n(individual) 
where n is the number of individuals considered. Utilitarianism and neoclassicism are 
therefore able to apply their reasoning about individual functioning and wellbeing to 
nations, markets, and humanity as a whole without qualms. As Jevons argues, “though 
the theory presumes to investigate the condition of a mind, and bases upon this 
investigation the whole of Economics, practically it is an aggregate of individuals which 
will be treated. The general forms of the laws of Economics are the same in the case of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Jevons, 1.29.  
10 These measures are also dependent on the assumption that individuals understand their 
own wants, needs, and desires fully. This is part of the assumption of humans being 
“rational,” which is a starting point for many models. See Mankiw, 480.  
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individuals and nations.”11 If the individual is at base guided by the pursuit of pleasure 
and avoidance of pain, then humanity’s highest law is the pursuit of maximum net 
pleasure. If the purpose of individual consumption is the amassing of more and more 
utility, then all markets and all nations should be organized to accommodate this goal.   
Such a treatment of societies and nations does not consider the interplay between 
individuals’ choices and lifestyles, does not factor in the cultural pressures and mores 
surrounding wellbeing, does not make any concession that human behavior is made 
meaningful by societal context and that society is therefore more complex and more 
interdependent than an aggregation of self-contained individuals.  
The emergence of welfare economics as a distinct branch of study might stand as 
evidence that this portrait of society has changed since Jevons’ writing. Welfare 
economics seeks to maximize social utility given a specific welfare function and to this 
end relies on much more complex models of society. Welfare economics does not 
explicitly restrict itself to the binary of pleasure and pain, and may seek to maximize any 
number of welfare indicators, including equity of resource distribution, economic 
freedom, and other such socially meaningful measures. Though the consideration of other 
welfare functions besides the maximization of aggregate utility marks a departure from 
Jevons’ work, welfare economics’ commitment to maximizing social utility, and the 
implied assertion that multiple and diverse virtues of human life can be equated, summed, 
and maximized still reflect the most fundamental assertions of Jevons and his 
contemporaries. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Jevons, 1.21. 
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 As we have seen, Jevons intentionally constructs his neoclassical theory on a 
foundation of utilitarian logic, drawing economic parallels to a body of ethical thought. In 
doing so he necessarily affirms certain philosophical assumptions about the nature of 
humanity. He protects himself and these specific philosophical assumptions against 
critiques in the section of his book entitled “Relation of Economics to Ethics.”  He is 
especially careful to defend the classification of all human experiences and emotions as 
either pleasures or pains. Though he has no issue accepting that human happiness is the 
ultimate measure of right and wrong, he qualifies this by saying that he has “never felt 
that there is anything in that theory to prevent our putting the widest and highest 
interpretation upon the terms used.”12 Quite simply, if we classify pain and pleasure 
loosely enough, all human functioning can be understood in these terms. Surely the 
robustness of a metric is questionable if it must be bent, stretched, and generalized in 
order to accommodate anything that might otherwise stand as its contradiction. Further, 
despite this caveat, Jevons still contends that human feeling can be arranged on a 
spectrum characterized above all by magnitude and direction (even if the spectrum itself 
is so loosely defined it almost loses meaning). Neoclassicism’s fundamental underlying 
metric, then, weakens itself by presuming too much about its own ability to accurately 
describe its subject. 
 Yet despite his commitment to this metric, in this section Jevons also writes of 
different rankings of human feeling, and humbly concedes, “it is the lowest rank of 
feelings which we here treat.”13 Though he seemingly acknowledges that his brand of 
economics can only offer one perspective on one sliver of man’s “feeling,” he later 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Jevons, 1.29. 
13 Jevons, 1.35.  
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writes, “in the science of Economics we treat men not as they ought to be, but as they 
are.”14 To treat man as he is is to consider each of his dimensions – certainly such a claim 
must be backed by a rigorous, careful, and holistic treatment. Unfortunately for Jevons, 
one cannot contend that one’s field of study treats men “as they are” while 
simultaneously relinquishing responsibility for all but the “lowest rank of feelings.” 
 In another partial concession, Jevons argues that economics can offer instruction 
on human behavior “in the absence of other motives,” but that the moral direction of 
these behaviors is beyond the scope of economic calculation. He explains, “each 
labourer, in the absence of other motives, is supposed to devote his energy to the 
accumulation of wealth. A higher calculus of moral right and wrong would be needed to 
show how he may best employ that wealth for the good of others as well as himself.”15 
This assertion begs several critiques. First, the assertion that a laborer is supposed to 
devote his energy to the accumulation of wealth should not be taken for granted, and by 
itself opens up whole avenues of criticism, which will be explored in the following. 
Second, it is hard if not impossible to imagine a situation in which an individual has no 
other motives besides wealth, which renders the recommendations of Jevons’ economics 
quite limited. Yet it is also hard to believe that economics does not make 
recommendations in the presence of other motives. In fact, Jevons claims over and over 
again that all motives can be boiled down to the avoidance of pleasure and pain, and goes 
on to build an entire economic theory on this claim. In fact, he argues that this theory can 
be used not only to understand the functioning of the individual but to build economic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Jevons, 3.2.  
15 Jevons, 1.35.  
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laws for nations as well. Jevons offers his theories as guides for the structures of society, 
and therefore cannot fairly say that moral right and wrong are not his within his purview.  
 Jevons’ inability to reconcile the assumptions of his work with their moral 
implications and imperatives reveals troubling internal inconsistencies. These 
inconsistencies beg further exploration and criticism of his work and of the school of 
thought that it represents.   
  
 20 
II: Critiquing Jevons and Neoclassical Thought 
Jevons’ difficulties in reconciling his economic theories with larger moral issues hint at 
the problems with the neoclassical portrait of human functioning. I will develop my 
critique further by drawing on the work of David Levine, Charles Taylor, Amartya Sen, 
and Robert and Edward Skidelsky. In the following subsections, I offer four main 
critiques of neoclassicism, continuing to use Jevons’ work as my point of departure. I 
first discuss Jevons’ theory of the origin of value. I use Levine to argue that the 
subjective and individual contrivance of value offered by neoclassicism is incomplete and 
inaccurate because it ignores the network of individual choices and social pressures that 
create meaning and value. Second, I explore the limitations of understanding human 
functioning within a binary of pleasure and pain. To do so I draw on Taylor’s theory of 
diverse goods, in which he posits that we cannot understand different virtues, values, and 
goods as commensurable or equivalent, and that to characterize human functioning in the 
way that neoclassicism does is to misstate the trade-offs that individuals face. Third, I 
critique revealed preference theory. In challenging this theory I draw on Sen’s critique of 
the “rational” human on which revealed preference theory relies, paying special attention 
to his treatment of commitment to different ideals and his concept of meta-preferences. 
Finally, I challenge the treatment of wealth as the fundamental pursuit of the laborer. To 
do so I use the work of Skidelsky and Skidelsky, forwarding their argument that the 
subjective metric of utility necessarily creates insatiability and scarcity, and is essentially 
meaningless.   
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Levine on the Origin of Use Value 
In his book, Needs, Rights, and The Market, David Levine points out that the 
utility-based understanding of value and the relationship between individual consumer 
and object is flawed if not downright nonsensical. As Levine says, we give meaning to an 
object’s purpose by using it, but the ways in which we can use this object is also 
determined by the object’s physical properties, as well as the social and cultural meanings 
surrounding the object.16 Take the example of a wooden chair. The user might sit on the 
chair to accomplish any number of seated tasks, stand on the chair to reach a high up 
place, burn the chair for heat, and so on – certainly the ways in which a chair can be used 
are numerous and varied, but each of these uses is dictated by the physical properties of 
the chair; we cannot eat the chair, drive the chair to work, or wear the chair for warmth.   
 Levine also points out that the choices a consumer makes about using an object do 
not exist in a vacuum – these choices are part of a tapestry of other consumption choices, 
and often arise because of or in synchrony with choices to consume other objects.17 
Levine uses the term “modes of living” to capture this feature of people’s wants, needs, 
and choices. We fulfill needs and make consumption choices in order to support life 
projects, sustain identities, and, Levine argues, pursue self-discovery.18 Levine deftly 
uses the example of buying a house to illustrate this point. Consumer A might buy a 
house because she loves to garden and it will be easier to have a garden if she has a house 
rather than an apartment. Gardening is important to her because she wants to feel 
connected to nature and because she wants to grow her own food. Consumer B buys the 	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  David Levine, Needs, Rights, and the Market (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1988), 38. 
17 Levine, 11.  
18 Levine, 14.	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exact same house, also because she wants a garden. However, she wants a garden not 
because she prefers a home-grown, organic diet but because a garden is part of building 
an aesthetically informed lifestyle. Consumer C might also buy the house, but the house 
has nothing to do with gardening – the house is in a good neighborhood and is therefore 
the status symbol she craves.19 As we can easily imagine, any number of consumers 
might make the exact same consumption choice for any number of reasons, and each 
choice would be comprehended differently when situated within the life project of each 
consumer.  
 Thus, Jevons may be correct that the usefulness of an object is not valuable solely 
as a function of the labor hours it took to make it, but it is not adequate to say that 
something is valuable just because someone wants it, as Jevons does. An object’s value is 
neither wholly in the object’s physicality nor in the consumer’s use of the object. Rather, 
it is contained in the mutual relationship between the two – the consumer’s ability to use 
the object is shaped by the object’s concrete material and cultural dimensions, and the 
consumer imbibes these dimensions with value by fitting the object into her unique mode 
of life. It is important to note at this point that Levine’s interventions are not restricted to 
instances of paying money for goods and services, but any choice that involves 
prioritizing some instrumentally valuable thing, tangible or intangible, in a trade-off 
(food, healthcare, shorter commuting times, etc.). I have used the term “object” and the 
examples of a chair and a house for simplicity’s sake.  
A neoclassical economist might at this point object, “of course people have 
myriad preferences and gain different magnitudes of utility from their consumption 
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choices – neoclassical economics readily concedes this. There is nothing in the above 
example that contradicts the logic of utility and preferences on which neoclassical 
economics is based.” But, as we have seen, Levine’s claims lead us to wonder if utility 
and preferences are the best way to describe consumer choices. Thinking of choices in 
relation to modes of living would open us up to discussion of consumption beyond the 
logic of utilitarianism and its role in neoclassical economics, and specifically, beyond the 
binary of pleasure and pain on which utilitarianism relies.  
  
Objections to the Binary of Pleasure and Pain 
The weakness of this metric of utility and disutility appears starker if we turn to 
Charles Taylor’s theory of diverse goods, which stands as an objection to utilitarian 
thought more generally. As Taylor points out in his work Philosophy and the Human 
Sciences, utilitarian thought (and by proxy neoclassical economics) emerged from 
enlightenment-era thinking, which above all valued an objective, dispassionate treatment 
of all subjects. Therefore by doing away with the qualitative differences between various 
“goods” and “bads” and reducing all of human functioning to a quantitative and 
subjective, but uniform, spectrum, utilitarianism was able to offer a new epistemology 
that appealed to the scientific sensibility of its time.20  
However “scientific” it might be, the idea that “happiness” is calculable and 
unquestioned distorts “the theoretical self-understanding of moderns.”21 Taylor argues 
that the modern conceives of herself as having inward depth and complexity, and that 
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 230. 
21 Taylor, 231.  
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self-discovery is a crucial attribute of modern functioning. By arranging human 
interaction and feeling on a linear spectrum, utilitarian thought treats desires, needs, and 
behaviors as arbitrary and given. It does not concern itself with the personal, social, and 
ethical context of these desires, needs, and behaviors, and is therefore deeply damaging to 
the modern’s capacity for self-understanding and possibly her ability to reflect on and 
realize this depth.   
Not only does this metric erase the depth of a modern’s self-reflection, it also 
obscures that “goods” are qualitatively different and therefore incomparable along a 
single metric. These qualitative distinctions between moral imperatives and ethical codes 
are present in every aspect of our lives. To illustrate this, Taylor writes of four examples 
of familiar moral codes by which people might organize their lives. First, the person 
whose central goal is to live with integrity, that is to avoid “the conformity to established 
standards” and instead live life in accordance with personal convictions. The second is 
the person who wishes to be a “channel of God’s love for men” by healing strife and 
difference and elevating humans’ love for each other. Third is the person who structures 
her life around the modern goal of liberation; she prioritizes each individual’s ability to 
direct his or her own life as he or she sees fit, free from the domination of natural or 
social mechanism. Finally, Taylor describes the person who prioritizes rationality above 
all else and strives to make clear, objective decisions free from illusion or self-
indulgence.22 
Each of these four moral outlooks, familiar archetypes to any reader, implies a 
mode of life that is incompatible and contrasting to the others. With this in mind, Taylor 
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asks, is it possible to coherently combine all moral imperatives? And therefore, is it 
appropriate to speak of a single morality or a single measure of goods?23 So arises 
Taylor’s argument that there is a diversity of goods that are mutually incomprehensible 
and irreconcilable precisely because they cannot coherently be compared to each other 
along a single scale.  
It could be argued that this line of reasoning strengthens the case for a 
subjectively ordered understanding of human functioning: since no calculus is capable of 
determining which moral outlook is “most worthy,” we resort to the measure that 
instructs each individual to pursue the outlook that gives her the most utility. By using the 
terms utility and disutility, utilitarianism, and the neoclassical thought that follows it, 
does not presume to understand what is worthy of pursuit for each individual. Someone 
who values honor and dignity more than anything else should engage in those activities 
that “maximize” honor and dignity, while one who organizes her life according to 
religious teachings gains the most utility from those activities that she classes as most 
pious. Interestingly, because utilitarianism bases its reasoning on truly subjective and 
personal measures of value, it can claim to be objective in that it is not influenced 
disproportionately by one viewpoint, nor does it purport one specific moral code. This 
echoes Jevons’ sentiment (outlined above) that economics studies and predicts the 
choices that individuals make without prescribing ethical guidelines or passing normative 
judgments (though Taylor would argue this contributes to an impoverished self-
understanding). 
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This justification for a subjectively defined metric of wellbeing might make sense 
if the theory of diverse goods simply suggested that within society, each individual is 
guided by a different ethical code. Yet Taylor’s diverse goods are more complicated than 
this. First, these ethical codes do not apply to discreet individuals. Rather, they can only 
be comprehended in a social fabric; they do not arise arbitrarily and individually and 
cannot be understood outside of the institutions and cultural constructions that surround 
them. Second, individuals are not strictly governed by just one clearly defined, socially 
created moral vision. These imperatives are not prescriptions or litanies that explicitly lay 
out paths to greater utility – it is more accurate to characterize them as cumulus masses of 
social and cultural forces, forming and reforming into complex and changeable 
expressions of human functioning and thought. Any number of ethical constructions 
might act on one person at any time.24 To characterize the problem as different levels of 
utility is to misstate the decisions and trade-offs that individuals face. 
Consider a young professional pursuing her high-paid dream job in a city far from 
her hometown. While growing up, her family always encouraged her to pursue her 
passions, and instilled in her a respect for family and a wish to care for her loved ones. As 
her parents grow old and sick, she is torn between multiple moral obligations and 
imperatives. By staying at her current job, she can easily afford her parent’s medical bills 
while pursuing her ambitions, as she was raised to do. Yet she is also morally impelled to 
move home to care for them in person. This is a simple example, but could easily become 
complicated when we add in more realistic layers, like a spouse’s job, a wish to move 
back to her hometown, and so on. Love for family is incomparable to the fulfillment of 
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pursuing a career, or making a parent proud, or supporting a spouse’s ambitions, or the 
nostalgia of returning home, or any number of other factors that might play into such a 
decision. As we can see from looking at this example or any aspect of our own lives, our 
morals are socially meaningful and also often in conflict with each other. These conflicts 
cannot be reconciled with a simple summation or subtraction. The multiple forces that 
motivate us differ not only in magnitude of importance but also in incommensurable, 
immeasurable qualitative differences. The denial of this, latent in the utility-disutility 
metric, is a mischaracterization of the issue and provides little guidance for decision-
making, as we see in relation to revealed preference theory.  
 
Beyond Revealed Preference Theory 
To see how neoclassical economists imagine individuals making such decisions I 
now return to the idea of revealed preferences, for which the theoretical work of Jevons 
and his contemporaries lays an important foundation. Roughly, revealed preference 
theory states that a rational individual’s preferences are internally consistent (if you like 
oranges more than bananas and bananas more than apples, you like oranges more than 
apples) and that if you spend resources on something, that thing must give you equal or 
greater utility than the resources you give up to attain it. Simply put, neoclassical 
economists assume an individual’s preferences are arranged linearly and coherently, and 
that these are revealed by an individual’s willingness to pay.  
 In his essay “Rational Fools,” Amartya Sen challenges this conception. He is 
critical not only of the logic of preference theory, but also of the “rational human” on 
which the argument is based. In his criticism, Sen draws on arguments that resonate with 
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the reasoning of Taylor and Levine. He argues that the linear and consistent arrangement 
of preferences paints a restrictive portrait of its human subject: it does not allow for the 
possibility that we can reflect on our preferences or that our preferences are socially 
motivated and manipulated.25 Preference theory is made possible by the logic of 
utilitarianism, so Sen’s critique of preference ordering is akin to Taylor’s critique of the 
metric of utility. Both thinkers agree that the individual is hemmed in and flattened by the 
neoclassical conception of rationality and human behavior.  
Sen posits two compelling challenges to the idea of a standard preference 
ordering. Like Taylor’s self-seeking modern, Sen’s subject is self aware and able to 
reflect on her preferences. He thus introduces the concept of “meta-preferences,” which 
can be understood as the desire to change one’s preferences. For example, many people 
might wish they did not enjoy cigarettes or unhealthy foods, or want to enjoy exercising, 
listening to classical music, or doing homework.26 These meta-preferences indicate 
deeper underlying desires to be healthy, to be perceived as cultured, or to be well 
educated, which suggests that preferences are nested and interwoven, and cannot be 
coherently ordered in a simple linear fashion.27 The concept of meta-preferences also 
acknowledges that there are social pressures indicating to us what we should want and 
need, and that personal preferences, meta or otherwise, are in part products of an 
individual’s socially constructed idea of herself.  
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For the revealed preference theorist, choice and wellbeing are essentially 
synonymous: if you choose something, it increases your utility in some way. Building on 
his account described above, Sen takes issue with this for several reasons. First, he writes, 
this view of preferences presumes both too much and too little simultaneously. It 
presumes personal wellbeing to be too large a part in the decision-making process – an 
adequate theory must leave room for other factors that might influence a decision. It also 
presumes too little by refusing to look at anything other than choices in order to indicate 
preferences.28 This narrow view of choice and preference, Sen argues, casts doubt on the 
neoclassical conception of human reasoning.  
 Yet Sen’s argument is more complex than a standard call for broader definitions. 
Central to his critique is a new element, one unexamined by the neoclassical preference 
theorist. This element is commitment. Different from both sympathy and personal 
wellbeing, commitment may drive choices to be made or actions taken even when they 
do not benefit one’s own wellbeing. Sympathy causes personal suffering from the pain of 
another, and personal gain from the wellbeing of another. A strict neoclassicist might 
imagine this narrowly as the addition of a positively correlated term to a personal utility 
function capturing the wellbeing of another. Yet Sen is concerned not with sympathy as a 
challenge to preference theory, but commitment. Commitment captures a more delicate 
human interaction. In this case, we are committed to the wellbeing of others even if it 
does not affect our own, and are therefore capable of feeling commitment to the 
wellbeing of people with whom we do not identify.29 Because commitment does not fit 
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into an understanding of wellbeing as a utility function or a willingness to pay, it stands 
as a direct challenge to the logic of preference theory and the claims it supports.  
In order to illustrate the distinction between sympathy and commitment Sen tells 
the story of two boys who find two apples, one large and one small. The first boy invites 
the second boy to choose the apple he prefers, and the second boy immediately chooses 
the larger apple. The first boy indignantly complains that this is unfair. “Well which 
would you have chosen?” the second boy asks. “The smaller, of course!” says the first 
boy. The second boy retorts, “don’t complain then, that’s the one you got!” Had the first 
boy’s claim that he would have chosen the smaller apple been based in sympathy (in 
utilitarian terms, he would have gained greater utility from the second boy eating the 
larger apple than had he himself eaten the apple), then he would have been satisfied with 
the way things went. Yet he was not satisfied, indicating that his hypothetical choice of 
the smaller apple would have been based on commitment to chivalry, politeness, or what 
have you, rather than sympathy.30 
 By driving a wedge between what we choose and what we prefer, the introduction 
of the concept of commitment rocks the foundations of preference theory. We cannot, as 
many neoclassical economists would like, simply eliminate commitment from the scope 
of economic analysis, since commitment is in many ways essential to the functioning of 
society. As Sen says, you cannot run a system based entirely on incentive to personal 
gain or fear of personal loss. In order for social and economic systems to function, a 
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majority of people must put aside their own personal wellbeing every day in one way or 
another.31 
Consider a mundane example, illustrative of many small moments in each 
individual’s life: jaywalking. In the decision to jaywalk, someone might weigh the 
increased convenience of jaywalking against feelings of sympathy for drivers and bikers 
who might be endangered by reckless behavior, a fear of being caught or hit (weighted 
based on perceived risk), and some other third factor, some sense of commitment to a 
community or an image of upstanding citizenry. The neoclassical preference theorist 
would argue that the potential jaywalker gains some modicum of utility from seeing 
herself as a good community member or upstanding citizen, and that this factors into her 
cost-benefit analysis of whether or not she should jaywalk. Yet it could be argued that 
this third factor stands outside both sympathy and personal gain – that although it is in 
her direct self-interest to increase her convenience by jaywalking, this citizen will not, 
because she is capable of perceiving herself as not only an individual with personal wants 
and needs but as a member of a complex social fabric that relies on her commitment to 
certain culturally conditioned behaviors.  
The self-reflective individual is central to the work of Sen, Levine, and Taylor. 
Though they differ in the emphases of their arguments, the thinkers agree that we gain 
self-awareness and self-definition through consideration of and for the other. This cannot 
be stated in terms of externalities or interactions between individual utility functions 
because such a characterization presumes that the individual arises in isolation and then 
interacts with a social context. Sen, Levine, and Taylor suggest the converse of this: that 
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individuals are inextricably and originally linked to the social pressures and commitments 
surrounding them, and that their choices are only meaningful as such. Introducing social 
consciousness and context to the portrait of the individual undermines Jevons’ claims and 
shows that neoclassicism is deeply limited in its ability to make meaningful contributions 
regarding human choices and behaviors.  
  
The Worthiness of Wealth 
 Jevons comments on the laborer’s pursuit of wealth only in passing. As 
mentioned in the preceding section, he claims “each labourer, in the absence of other 
motives, is supposed to devote his energy to the accumulation of wealth.”32 The fact that 
he spends no more than a sentence on this claim is in itself telling. Jevons feels that this 
assumption is so obvious that it does not require further explanation or examination. That 
the unfettered pursuit of wealth is central to the neoclassical economy is hardly 
disputable.  Yet this does not make it exempt from examination.  
 It could be argued, again from a perspective of wishing to remain objective, that 
the neoclassicist does not actually believe that each individual’s base concern is the 
accumulation of money (believing as she does that money is inherently worthless and 
only valuable when spent). The neoclassical economist uses money as a proxy for the 
pursuit of something truly worthwhile so that she can abdicate the task of figuring out 
what, exactly, is inherently worthwhile, what actually does contribute to our wellbeing.33 
But we need not abdicate this task. 
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 In their book How Much Is Enough? Robert and Edward Skidelsky criticize the 
pursuit of wealth as the central economic goal, basing their argument on the failures of 
neoclassical logic. Wealth, they argue, is not a meaningful metric because we can literally 
never have enough of it – satiation is not meaningful concepts within a neoclassical 
system.34 This is not a moralistic judgment on human nature, greed, or any other such 
normative claim. Rather, it is a logical observation of the neoclassical measure of value 
and its implications for the meaning of wealth. As discussed extensively above, 
neoclassical measures of value and thus wealth are fully subjective because value arises 
from want. Therefore “enough” wealth is, by definition, as much wealth as one wants. 
Above all, the theories and practices of neoclassical economics seek to allocate scarce 
resources efficiently, yet the concept of scarcity is a false construction because it arises 
from a comparison between what is available to us and what we can imagine wanting.35 
With such a boundless measure of the proxy for wellbeing, the neoclassical conception of 
wellbeing itself becomes essentially meaningless.   
 
Addressing Possible Counterarguments 
It is unlikely that Jevons, his contemporaries, and the neoclassical thinkers that 
follow them would argue against these various shades and complexities – that the 
utilitarian portrait of humanity is a simplification is, of course, not what is at issue. 
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an end goal. This would suggest that the proxy by which we measure the pursuit of utility 
(money) becomes the source of utility itself, rendering both the measurement and the 
exercise of measuring nonsensical. 
34 Robert Skidelsky and Edward Skidelsky, How Much Is Enough?: Money and the Good 
Life, (New York: Other Press, 2012), 86.  
35 Skidelsky and Skidelsky, 92. 
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moral being. However, in pursuing an economic calculus that relies on these simplifying 
assumptions, neoclassical thinkers necessarily affirm the legitimacy of these assumptions. 
They accept that at base, their portrait of a human is a useful one.36 In so doing, the 
neoclassicist implicitly affirms that her simplistic form of the human is necessary and 
helpful in pursuing the dominant practice of economics.  
The neoclassical thinker might at this point intervene with a predictably 
“pragmatic” objection. “All of these objections are fair,” she might say, “but the truth is, 
regardless of the limitations of the models, their oversights and their failures, neoclassical 
tools are the best ones we have. It is more pragmatic to hone these tools than to tear them 
down, especially when no concrete alternative can be offered.” I respond to this claim 
with two counterarguments. 
First, the use of the term “pragmatic” in defending neoclassical economics is as 
flawed as it is common. What appears to be a neutral term is in fact a convenient and 
normative judgment used to legitimize dominant theories by marginalizing alternatives as 
pie-in-the-sky or niche. “Pragmatism” is simply a euphemism for “that doesn’t fit within 
the existing order.” Such a judgment is therefore not useful or applicable to any serious 
critique of neoclassicism because any such critique will necessarily stand outside of the 
system it examines.  
Second, the dismissal of a critique due to the lack of a proposed alternative is both 
a positive argument and a logical fallacy that demonizes theoretical and philosophical 
thought. Any dominant hegemonic system, especially one that is so effectively disguised 
as objective and morally neutral, is worthy of being scrutinized. Further, the claim that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Recall that although he attempts to acknowledge the limitations of his study, Jevons’ 
still goes as far as to claim that economics deals with men “as they are.”   
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pragmatism justifies avoiding scrutiny is deeply dangerous. I therefore dismiss claims 
that neoclassical solutions and models are the most pragmatic despite their flaws, simply 
because I do not subscribe to the definition of the word pragmatic as it is used in such 
arguments, nor am I concerned with making my own arguments appear “pragmatic” to 
the neoclassical mind.37   
I argue that neoclassical theory is willfully and repeatedly parsimonious in its 
portrait of humanity, that over and over again the depth and meaning of human feeling is 
sacrificed for the sake of a sleek, simple model designed to appeal to an empirical 
economist’s sensibility. I further argue that these failures and sacrifices are not benign, 
nor are they helpful in sketching the human being or in understanding our social lives. 
They are deeply damaging to the ways in which we organize our societies and perceive 
our wellbeing. Nowhere is this more dramatically evidenced than in the choices that are 
leading us to the destruction of our planet.  
In concluding these sections specifically regarding neoclassical theory and 
practice, I wish to highlight that my critique has not been a prescriptive or moralistic one 
– it cannot be boiled down to “you can’t buy happiness” or “we need a system that makes 
us think more about others.” Rather, this has been an effort to critically engage with the 
underlying assumptions and internal logic of neoclassical thought. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 This does not rule out policy recommendations as a potential outcome of these 
arguments – though they might technically “work within the system,” such 
recommendations have the potential to push the bounds of existing legal frameworks and 
in so doing, pose a challenge to the neoclassical model of the economy.   
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III: Defining Wellbeing 
 
As discussed above, within neoclassical economics, no matter the metric of wellbeing 
used there is an underlying singularity to the understanding of wellbeing, evidenced in 
the persistent idea that no matter how many virtues you enumerate, they can be equated 
and aggregated to equal an understanding of wellbeing. This understanding is both vague 
and parsimonious. It claims to be subjectively defined through preferences, yet is actually 
prescriptive, self-serving, and limiting to the modern self. In the following I develop an 
alternative understanding of wellbeing. I introduce the work of Angus Deaton, using his 
insights to suggest that wellbeing diverges from individually self-reported happiness, and 
that societal wellbeing cannot be understood as the sum of individual wellbeing. 
Outlining the implications of Deaton’s insights alongside Sen, Levine, and Taylor, I 
reemphasize the significance of acknowledging multiple and diverse goods. Further, I 
note that each of these thinkers champions the intrinsic value of the pursuit of these 
goods or virtues. Having explored a general understanding of wellbeing, I go on to 
highlight the specific virtues, the “basic goods” I find most significant in the pursuit of a 
good life, using the above thinkers along with Robert and Edward Skidelsky’s How Much 
Is Enough? as my guide.  
 
The Intrinsic Value of Pursuing Wellbeing 
 In his 2013 article “Two Happiness Puzzles,” Deaton gives an overview of 
several counterintuitive findings of economic research on wellbeing. He discusses a study 
that examines the correlation between religion and several wellbeing indicators on both 
U.S. state-wide and individual levels. He notes that while religious people report being 
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happier, more religious states experience higher crime rates, teen pregnancies, divorce 
rates, venereal diseases per capita, and poorer health.38 He explains this “aggregation 
puzzle,” as he calls it, by saying “one story is that religiosity is a response to a hostile 
environment, not the cause of it. […] Religion provides a partial refuge from disease and 
distress when it can, and a promise of relief in the next world when it cannot.”39 This is 
not a particularly outstanding insight, but rather a simple question of the direction of 
causality. In addition to the very believable narrative Deaton offers, I suggest two other 
insights that may be drawn from this puzzle.    
 The first echoes a theme I have hinted at earlier in the paper. This puzzle suggests 
that society is not simply an additive function of its members and their personally 
reported happiness, nor can the wellbeing of society be captured (or even estimated) by 
an enumerable list of measured variables in a wellbeing function. Rather, society is 
greater than the sum of its parts, and the health of a community is an intangible good that 
in and of itself benefits community members beyond a simple interaction term between 
individual wellbeings. This communal health is indivisible and intrinsic in that it cannot 
be broken down into discreet variables or represented through the use of proxies. The 
puzzle that Deaton has highlighted points to the necessity of a more robust and carefully 
examined understanding of communal wellbeing and its importance in an individual 
defining and pursuing a good life.  
The second regards the use of happiness as a goal or metric. In the study to which 
Deaton refers, happiness does not appear to align with health, safety, or access to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Angus Deaton, “Two Happiness Puzzles,” American Economic Review: Papers and 
Proceedings, Vol. 103, No. 3 (2013), 593.  
39 Deaton, 596.	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education and opportunity (in fact, they often seem to be inversely related). This does not 
mean, however, that health, safety, and access to education and opportunity are not 
worthy of pursuit. It rather indicates that reporting yourself to be happy does not indicate 
that you are leading a good life, and that perceived or reported happiness (however that is 
defined on a survey or interpreted by a wide range of people) is not the same thing as 
fundamental wellbeing. This is reflected in Deaton’s concluding discussion of another 
“happiness puzzle” – the often-cited finding that women who are “autonomous” (which 
we may understand to mean financially independent but perhaps also liberated or 
empowered in the feminist sense) report lower levels of wellbeing than other women.40 
Does this mean that the empowerment of women should be abandoned as a key to 
creating and protecting a good life? Probably not. It reemphasizes that freedom, like 
health and security, are intrinsically valuable and cannot be understood as building blocks 
or summable variables in the pursuit of some singular understanding of wellbeing, be that 
“happiness” or “utility.” Deaton echoes this sentiment with his concluding sentence: “To 
many of us, the capacities that come with greater freedom are as or more important than 
what we report about our feelings having been granted that freedom.”41  
Deaton’s championing of freedom as intrinsically, in addition to instrumentally, 
valuable parallels Sen’s emphasis on capacity building in Development as Freedom. Sen 
argues that the development of human capacities is worthwhile not only because these 
capacities allow people to advocate for their own safety, provide for themselves and their 
families, and so on, but also because striving for human potential is in itself valuable, 
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indispensible, in the personal project of making one’s life meaningful.42 Here, Deaton 
and Sen recall Levine; all three thinkers emphasize the pursuit of life projects, the 
building of capacities, or securing of freedoms as intrinsically worthwhile efforts.  
 
Criteria for the Basic Goods  
Having established that there is not just one measurable positive state of being but 
rather several different, or in Taylor’s words, diverse goods, and that the struggle to 
achieve these diverse goods is itself virtuous, I turn now to a discussion of what these 
goods are. In doing so I follow the work of Skidelsky and Skidelsky, who themselves 
establish a list of “basic goods,” which are each elements of the good life and share four 
defining qualities.  
First, all basic goods are universal – they are not, in their essence, locally 
defined.43 The list of basic goods as universal, while plausible, is by no means inarguable. 
I readily concede that basic goods may differ across cultures, and I do not seek to 
prescribe a single way of pursuing a good life. I present this list first to illustrate the 
diversity and incommensurability of the aspects of a good life (however these are 
defined), but also to engage in an exercise I argue to be inherently valuable and to 
emphasize that policy and personal action must be guided by an examination of what is 
inherently worthwhile. In this definition of universal, I confine my discussion of basic 
goods and the good life to the contemporary era. By this I mean the era in which 
democratic social contract theory has been dominant and the protection of equal rights 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.: 1999), 27, 
32.	  
43 Skidelsky and Skidelsky, 150.  
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have been central to political thought. This aligns with the work of Sen and Taylor, all of 
whom deal with discussions of wellbeing in the contemporary sense. The question of 
distillable human essence and goodness that crosses time periods requires a different 
philosophical discussion, which I do not engage in this paper.  
Second, all basic goods are final, meaning they are not means to a greater end.44  I 
argue the while basic goods must be final, they can, and almost always are, necessary for 
the achievement of another aspect of a good life. For example, freedom of speech is 
intrinsically valuable but is also necessary for the establishment of healthy communities 
and basic lasting safety; leisure time is intrinsically valuable but is also necessary for 
investment in friendships and the pursuit of life projects.  
Third, Skidelsky and Skidelsky say that basic goods are not part of some other 
good. Freedom from cancer, they say, is both universal and final but it is not a basic good 
because it is part of the larger good of health.45 Similarly, freedom from war is universal 
and final but it is not a basic good because it is part of the larger good of security, which 
also encompasses protection against assault, rape, theft, and so on.    
Finally, they say that all basic goods are indispensible — too lose one is to suffer 
great harm.46 A neoclassicist might interpret this condition of basic goods by saying that 
each of them is a complimentary good – that is, wellbeing, or some measure of the good 
life, cannot increase without each of these increasing, and that to lose one of these is to 
decrease a measure of the good life over all. It might be further argued by the 
neoclassical economist that the assembly of a list of basic goods that are necessary for the 
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pursuit of a good life is simply a different framing of the same exercise of the welfare 
economist. That is, one might ask, how is a list of basic goods any different from the 
specification of a welfare function? Before turning to my definition of basic goods I will 
address these arguments.  
It is not the welfare economist’s search to define the aspects of welfare that I take 
issue with, nor do I think all economic theory is in opposition to a philosophical 
definition of virtue; indeed, in his work A Theory of Justice, John Rawls contributed 
greatly to the cannon of social philosophy with the specification of the maximin function. 
Rather, my main concern is that mainstream contemporary economics privileges its 
assumptions about the market above an honest portrait of the human subject, stretching 
its understandings of the functioning of humanity to a breaking point in order to 
accommodate the “clarifying assumptions” of scarcity, utility maximization, and revealed 
preference theory. Therefore in my definition of the aspects of the good life I distance my 
discussion from any claims about markets, and I make no assumptions about the 
“rationality” of human behavior.  
Further, I argue that the specification of a welfare function differs greatly from the 
exercise of imagining a good life simply because the specification of a welfare function is 
not intrinsically virtuous, while the practice of defining wellbeing may in itself be an 
indispensible aspect of the creation of the good life; the search for virtue is itself virtuous. 
This premise recalls the work of Sen, Deaton, and Levine, who emphasize capacities, 
freedoms, and the pursuit of life projects as inherently valuable. 
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The Basic Goods  
I turn now to a specific discussion of wellbeing, following the work of Skidelsky 
and Skidelsky. Their list of seven basic goods includes: health, security, personality, 
harmony with nature, leisure, respect, and friendship.47 In the following I discuss each of 
these seven, offering clarification, complexity, and at times challenges to Skidelsky and 
Skidelsky’s descriptions of the basic goods.  
Perhaps the two least contestable basic goods are health and security. Health can 
be understood as physical wellbeing, nourishment, and access to sufficient care, while 
security is characterized as the reasonable expectation that one’s life will not be 
interrupted by war, crime, violence, or persecution.48 Incidentally, the two least 
contestable goods are also the goods that are guaranteed to be transgressed at the end of 
every human life—that is, each life gives way to a loss of either health or security. 
However it cannot be contested that society benefits from a pursuit of these two goods.  
What is contestable is the extent to which these goods remain good in all 
circumstances. Health, for example, becomes controversial in areas of life support for the 
very elderly and abortion practice, both of which may be seen to desecrate the good life, 
depending on one’s perspective. Similarly, with regard to security, one can imagine “too 
much security” impeding the pursuit of the good life – constant armament, surveillance, 
and awareness of imminent danger may breed widespread anxiety or paranoia. Further, 
one person might define security as the right to bear arms, while another person might 
feel that she is endangered by guns carried by her fellow citizens. This paper does not 
presume to offer definitive answers regarding gun control, the Hippocratic oath, or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Skidelsky and Skidelsky, 154 – 165.  
48 Skidelsky and Skidelsky, 154 – 156.	  	  
 43 
reproductive rights; I simply wish to acknowledge that these goods may have bounds 
outside of which they cease to be good, and that the constant collaborative negotiation of 
these bounds is a necessary and inherently virtuous aspect of the creation of the good life. 
Less concretely definable than health and security, though equally worthy of 
consideration, is the good Skidelsky and Skidelsky call personality.49 I prefer to term this 
good the capacity to pursue life projects. In doing so I unite the work of Sen, whose 
capacity-based approach emphasizes capacity building as both instrumentally and 
intrinsically valuable, and Levine, who repeatedly highlights the importance of the 
individual’s “life project.” By life project I, like Levine, mean the freedom and ability to 
fulfill and create one’s life based on self-directed goals and values.  
It is in reference to this basic good that Taylor’s diverse goods are most useful—
though they apply to most of the other basic goods as well (as we have seen with both 
health and security), it is in the pursuit of an individual life project that one may be 
personally challenged by the conflict between diverse goods. Such personal conflict is 
discussed at length in the preceding section. Though the diversity, complexity, and often 
irreconcilability of these goods may challenge the individual’s ability to create a fulfilling 
life it in no way undermines such a pursuit. Rather, as I have argued before, the 
negotiation of these goods is in itself a key aspect of any life project; such negotiations 
cannot be understood as cleanly executed tradeoffs because the struggle to make the 
tradeoff itself may be an act of deeper self-understanding.  
Implicit in Skidelsky and Skidelky’s description of personality as a good is a 
liberal focus on the individual. Though I also make room in my definition for the 
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personal nature of life projects, I wish to note that my use of the term “life projects” 
rather than “personality” leaves room for a collaborative, communal, or inter-personal 
experience. I further explore this departure from Skidelsky and Skidelsky’s liberal 
priorities below.   
  Skidelsky and Skidelsky continue their list of the basic goods with harmony with 
nature. In their discussion of the human-nature relationship, the two authors present and 
then rejecting two extreme relationships to nature. The first they term “shallow 
environmentalism,” which argues for the conservation of the environment based on its 
utility to human kind in the form of exploitable resources. They argue that this 
relationship does not represent the basic good of harmony with nature because it neither 
captures the aesthetic and spiritual relationship to nature well-documented throughout 
human history, nor is it a “final” good, since it views nature as a means to an end.50 The 
second relationship they call “deep environmentalism,” a viewpoint that claims all of 
nature to be intrinsically worthy outside of human valuation. They dismiss this 
understanding of nature for two reasons: first, they claim, the grouping of all organic 
matter into one category (“nature”) is a human construction and therefore not meaningful 
outside of a human valuation. Further, they argue, it is patently ridiculous to claim that all 
of “nature” is worthy of preservation on the part of humanity— that eradicating a small-
pox virus is the same as killing a dog.51 Skidelsky and Skidelsky instead argue for a third 
view of nature, an aesthetic and philosophical treatment. They present harmony with 
nature as analogous to one’s relationship to a garden: nature as both a concept and a 
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physicality worthy of being protected is shaped in accordance with the human sensibility, 
yet also flourishes independent from complete human control.52  
Though Skidelsky and Skidelsky do not explicitly state this, it seems that both 
deep environmentalists and shallow environmentalists fail in their understanding of the 
worthiness of nature because they divorce the human from the natural. The “garden 
relationship” may be more truthful or worthwhile because it emphasizes the human as 
part of nature and vice versa, and the opportunity to experience one’s self as such is both 
intuitively appealing and worthy of being protected.  
Continuing their definition of the good life, Skidelsky and Skidelsky champion 
the worthiness of leisure. Skidelsky and Skidelsky are careful to point out that while a 
substitution away from labor may leave more room for leisure, leisure is not simply “not 
work;” unlike rest, leisure is characterized by spontaneity and the cultivation of skill. In 
Marxian terms leisure can be described as “non-alienated labor,” that is, action free from 
external compulsion.53 Therefore work that is compensated with money could 
hypothetically be leisure – it is the socially conditioned and institutionally enforced 
compulsion to work that makes contemporary labor different from leisure, according to 
Skidelsky and Skidelsky. But why is leisure a basic good? Non-leisure time is time spent 
doing something for the sake of something else, and therefore life without leisure, 
Skidelsky and Skidelsky argue, “is a life spent always in preparation, never in actual 
living. Leisure is the wellspring of higher thought and culture, for it is only when 
emancipated form the pressure of need that we really look at the world.”54   
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This defense of leisure undermines a favorite neoclassical boogie-man: the idea 
that if we stop incentivizing labor or investment (with property taxes, estate taxes, more 
progressive income taxes, shorter working days, income redistribution policies, welfare 
safety nets, and so on), the flow of innovation and creative energy, so necessary for 
growth, will be stymied. This line of argument is flawed in two ways. First, it offers an 
immensely shallow understanding of human creativity, positing that without the carrot-
and-stick of profit and loss we would be utterly unimaginative and dull. Second, it casts 
human innovation as a cog in the growth machine and not something inherently precious 
or remarkable, failing to acknowledge that perhaps growth is the part of this sequence 
that is only instrumentally valuable, that growth should be pursued only insofar as it 
enhances general capacity to live creative and innovative lives, and not the other way 
around.  
This perspective on growth recalls the neoclassical tenet of scarcity discussed in a 
prior section; as long as scarcity is defined as the differential between what we can 
imagine wanting and what is available to us, we will always live in destitute paucity. Yet 
this neoclassical description does not appeal to any sense of intuition— the western 
world, and much of the world beyond, exudes abundance (the distribution of this 
abundance is, of course, a completely different issue). It is not intuitively accurate to say 
that the major economic problem is maximization in the face of scarcity, yet this 
continues to be a guiding principle as long as we define scarcity and want in neoclassical 
terms. Therefore Skidelsky and Skidelsky’s emphasis on a substitution toward leisure and 
away from labor necessarily challenges us to reimagine our understandings of “enough.”  
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Having established my definitions of leisure, harmony with nature, health, 
security, and life projects (or personality) I turn now to those aspects of Skidelsky and 
Skidelsky’s argument that I find less intuitively appealing. The first is respect. Quite 
simply, I find their definition of this term to be vague and unhelpful. In my interpretation 
of this good, I prefer to split respect into two categories. First, democratic rights must, in 
the contemporary era, be understood as a basic good. The inclusion of democratic rights 
is not meant to marginalize or erase peoples or societies that exist outside of democratic 
frameworks but rather to acknowledge that in a post-colonial era, the ability to self-
determine outside of the structure of a nation-state has been deeply undermined, and that 
within the hegemonic structure of the nation-state the democratic rights are worthy of 
being protected.  
In addition to the protection of the institutional respect for the citizen, there is a 
second, more social, aspect of Skidelsky and Skidelsky’s respect, which I prefer to call 
dignity. To illustrate the distinction between democratic rights and the preservation of 
dignity, I use the example of racism against black Americans in its many forms: the 
abolition of slavery, suffrage, and the end of segregation all factor into the protection of 
democratic rights, which are the just deserts of any citizen, yet these democratic rights do 
not protect against social and institutional racism in the form of higher incarceration 
rates, tokenism, fetishism, degrading stereotypes, and regressive media portrayals (to 
name but a few social phenomena that persistently plague black communities). Protection 
from these (and many other) social ills constitutes dignity, and is a basic good and tenet 
of the good life. Dignity, like all other goods, has negotiable bounds. It is true to say that 
all people deserve to be free from relentless social marginalization, yet to what degree 
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different transgressions undermine the basic good of dignity is a difficult question. Do we 
deserve to be free from feelings of humiliation, shame, degradation, and alienation at 
every part of our lives? And if we are not at all times protected from such transgressions, 
is it accurate to say that the goodness of our lives has been compromised? Perhaps some 
feelings of loss of respect may be helpful in prompting us to self-reflection. Though such 
questions mark an ongoing pursuit to define the specifics of human dignity, it can be 
agreed that human dignity in its most basic form is indispensible to the leading of a good 
life.  
Skidelsky and Skidelsky also include “friendship” as a basic good, arguing that 
human companionship (including family, romantic relationships, and so on) is a 
fundamental good.55 They choose to include “friendship” instead of “community” 
because they find the word “community” to be overwrought and lacking in meaning.56 I 
do not object to the inclusion of friendship as a basic good, and in fact find it to be one of 
the less contentions goods, but I disagree with the exclusion of community. However 
much of a buzzword this has become in recent literature, it cannot reasonably be left off 
of any list that seeks to define human wellbeing. Community overlaps with but differs 
from friendship. While friendship may refer to intimate one-on-one relationships (which 
are indisputably valuable), community refers to a human context in which to define one’s 
self. Alienation from one’s community, even if specific friendships are preserved, is 
surely damaging to one’s wellbeing.  
Skidelsky and Skidelky’s mistrust of an emphasis on the community reflects the 
liberal individualist leanings mentioned above. They are concerned that communal 	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pressure can become oppressive and is likely to trespass upon the freedom of the 
individual.57 Though I concede that this is a possibility, I also argue that in many 
instances, community makes possible the rights and freedoms of the individual. As with 
all other goods, there are negotiable bounds to the goodness of community, but this does 
not preclude community from being a basic good in some capacity.  
In my definition, a universalizable good life can be defined in terms that run 
parallel to Skidelsky and Skidelsky’s postulate. The good life in the contemporary era, 
that is, the era in which the individual’s equal rights are prioritized, is defined by good 
health, security, harmony with nature, the capacity to conduct a life project, time for 
leisure, friendship, community, human dignity, and the protection of democratic rights 
and freedoms. I concede that across the world it is the privileged and the few who 
experience each of these goods, and I do not mean to imply that the unhealthy, the 
disabled, the endangered and disenfranchised, and so on cannot lead good lives. I simply 
argue that these goods are guiding tenets for the pursuit of a good life. To echo Angus 
Deaton, it may be the pursuit of these tenets and the struggle to further define them that is 
equally or more virtuous than the achievement of the goods themselves.  
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IV: Environmentalism and the Good Life 
The word “environmentalism” has become trite through overuse. Whether it reminds one 
of “eco-friendly” products packaged in craft paper or brings to mind yet another petition 
calling earnestly to “save” the rainforest, it seems that this word has lost its descriptive 
ability; it does not capture the urgency of its own project, nor the catastrophic scope of 
the problems it addresses. Before engaging in a discussion of environmentalism and the 
good life, I therefore wish to re-emphasize the most serious meaning of this word. By 
environmentalism I do not echo the snappy imperative to “go green!” nor do I engage in 
doom’s-day-style warnings. Instead, I mean to reiterate the inherently worthy project of 
transforming human behavior and imagination so that it more harmoniously aligns with 
our wellbeing in the most fundamental sense. Environmentalism by its truest and most 
sincere definition, then, is the pursuit of the good life. I will discuss climate change as a 
way of exploring my claims, because it has emerged as the key environmental issue of 
our times, though I am sensitive to the long history of environmental activism and 
thought that precedes an awareness of climate change. 
 
Environmentalism and the Basic Goods 
 Though often represented as a sacrifice or a tradeoff with human wellbeing, 
environmentally conscious behaviors actually align with many of the basic goods. Apart 
from “harmony with nature,” (the parallels with which are evident), the building of 
meaningful communities, the protection of one’s health and security, the creation of 
leisure time, and the preservation one’s democratic rights either advance or are advanced 
by environmental pursuits. Simply put, though fighting climate change inevitably comes 
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with many serious inconveniences, expenses, and challenges, it also gives us the 
opportunity to re-examine what is meaningful and the motivation to alter our behaviors to 
more consciously pursue the basic tenets of a good life. It is crucial that we think of 
environmentalism not just a series of cost-benefit analyses, that we not allow our project 
to become the weighing of narrower profit margins against the costs of forced migration, 
the burden of joblessness against the healthcare costs associated with mosquito-borne 
illness. Again, here, we recall Taylor’s emphasis on diverse and incommensurable goods 
in human society. A serious call to reshape our societies and lives is crucial not just in 
fighting climate change but also in the project of taking the pursuit of our own wellbeing 
seriously.  
The urgency to end climate change in order to protect our own health and security 
is obvious and irresistible. The scientific community overwhelmingly agrees that climate 
change will have massive negative impacts on global agricultural output,58 will increase 
the spread of infections diseases,59 will force mass migrations due to land and resource 
loss,60 and will destroy lives, communities, and property by causing increasingly extreme 
weather patterns.61 In addition to threatening local communities with natural disasters, as 
resources become more and more scarce, international cooperation and community could 
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splinter and result in conflict over water and arable land.62 It is unequivocal that climate 
change poses a heinous threat to human wellbeing in the most fundamental sense, and 
that environmentalism is integral to any meaningful effort to preserve individual health 
and safety as well as international community and security.  
 Conversely, sincere investment in one’s community fosters environmentally 
conscious behaviors by superseding hyper-individualistic lifestyles. Community based 
transportation (public transit, car-pooling, etc.) and food sourcing in the form of co-ops, 
Community Sourced Agriculture (CSA), and local farms decrease a household’s carbon 
footprint while invigorating communal relationships. Further, local public spaces 
decrease demand for large houses and long, private trips outside of the community. These 
are simply a few basic and intuitive examples of the ways in which vibrant communal life 
and shared local economies might alter the environmentally degrading hyper-
individualistic habits while creating meaningful and desired social bonds; it is not 
difficult to imagine a host of other ways in which this connection might make itself 
evident.  
 The fundamental connection between community-building and ending climate 
change extends beyond the local level. It is widely understood that we will not be able to 
avoid staying beneath the generally accepted benchmark of 2.5o C of warming without 
international cooperation. Under a global cap and trade scheme, for example, 
industrialized nations would bear the cost of poorer nations’ abatement, allowing poorer 
nations to profit while transitioning to more sustainable technologies. Policies such as 
this one that rely on international coordination for abatement have the added advantage of 	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redistributing wealth while fostering a sense of responsibility and cooperation between 
nations. We are prompted to recall Sen’s insight regarding commitment to higher ideals 
regardless of their weight on our private conveniences and preferences. In addition to 
securing our health and safety, coordinated efforts between societies and nations to 
address climate change compels us to reexamine the ideals to which we are committed 
and reorganize our communities, local and global, to better reflect these commitments. 
Like a commitment to reinvigorating and re-examining both local and global 
communities, the creation of true leisure time also interrupts unfulfilling and 
environmentally unsound lifestyles. Substituting labor for leisure demands personal re-
examination of what is “enough” and, as economic theory states, requires a substitution 
away from consumption. However, this substitution may itself contribute to the good life 
if it is a movement away from instrumental toward intrinsic value and if it affords one the 
opportunity to reexamine personal life projects, needs, and goals. This personal choice 
can be scaled up to be understood as society-level “degrowthing,” which would mark a 
movement away from the hollow project of surplus accumulation and a culture-wide 
commitment to an intrinsically good life.  
In his work Toward a Steady State Economy, Herman Daly posits an argument 
that reflects this perspective on “degrowthing.” He asserts that the physical constrains of 
the planet, so powerfully evidenced by environmental degradation, require us to 
transition toward a steady-state economy.63 Daly denounces “Growthmania,” which he 
characterizes as the ubiquitous obsession with growth as a solution to all problems, born 
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of neoclassicism’s framing of want, and therefore scarcity, as infinite.64  He astutely notes 
that “Growthmania” perpetuates and legitimizes itself by positing growth as the solution 
to all of the negative aspects of growth, and therefore does not recognize any costs to 
growth, only benefits. Daly illustrates, “is the water table falling? Dig deeper wells, build 
bigger pumps, and up goes GNP! Mines depleted? Build more expensive refineries to 
process lower grade ore, and up goes GNP!”65 Simply, by positioning itself as the remedy 
to all of the ailments it causes, a growth-based economy entraps us in the belief that non-
market solutions are not pragmatic or feasible. Daly continues, “as more and more of the 
finite physical world is converted into wealth, less and less is left over as non-wealth 
[…]. This creates an illusion of becoming better off, when in actuality we are becoming 
worse off.”66 By necessity, the neoclassical tenets of unbridled want and resulting 
scarcity beget reliance on a growth-based economy, and in doing so lead us directly away 
from what is best for our wellbeing. Thus a society-wide re-examination of needs and 
wants, and a subsequent movement toward leisure and away from consumption would 
simultaneously slow climate change, advance environmental projects, and contribute to 
wellbeing.  
In his book Deep Economy, Bill McKibben echoes the idea that environmentalism 
offers us an opportunity to reorganize our priorities and reinvigorate our pursuit of 
wellbeing. McKibben presents the imperatives of environmentalism in the industrialized 
world not as harrowing burdens, but as opportunities for critical evaluation and careful 
reorganization of societal structures. McKibben emphasizes the richness and resilience of 
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communal living and its ability to both alter damaging behaviors and contribute to 
personal fulfillment. Especially compelling is McKibben’s narrative of eating only 
locally produced food. In the description of his year eating only from the Lake 
Champlain Valley, McKibben unites the basic human pleasure of eating good food with 
community, innovation, and sustainability. The environmental incentives to eat locally 
produced and organic food from small farms are straightforward: the average American 
bite travels 1500 miles before consumption, and each bushel of corn produced on a 
government-subsidized “mega-farm” requires half a barrel of oil to produce, a calculation 
that does not include the packaging and storage necessary to keep costs low for 
agricultural conglomerates.67 Intuitively, food production that relies on a small local 
market and uses labor rather than heavy machinery is far more environmentally sound.  
Alongside the environmental justification, McKibben emphasizes the simple 
pleasures of eating fresh produce, meat, and dairy and the stronger sense of community 
that arises from engaging with community-sourced agriculture groups, farmer’s markets, 
microbreweries, and family farms. By contrast “Big Agra” is not only responsible for 
around ten percent of American carbon emissions68 (this does not include food 
transportation), it is also deeply detrimental to communities built around family farms69 
and produces an extremely narrow range of crops; commercial crops are dominated by 
corn, soy, hay, and oats. As McKibben says, “essentially we are subsidizing Cheetos.”70  
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Unlike the other authors discussed, McKibben does not forward a particular social 
or political philosophy. Rather, his work offers a tangible personal narrative that frames 
environmentalism, community, and personal fulfillment in an intuitive and appealing 
way. It is easy to imagine that reinvigorating and investing in communities might not 
only stimulate the technologies of production necessary to fight climate change, it might 
also reflect a shift toward the identification and pursuit of what we actually want. 
Like McKibben, Naomi Klein, in her book This Changes Everything, frames the 
fight against climate change as an opportunity to re-examine social organization. 
However, though she also touches on the importance of community organizing and a 
movement away from hyper-individualistic lifestyles, Klein specifically focuses on 
corporate infringement on democratic rights within industrialized nations, how this 
contributes to climate change, and the ways in which the environmental movement offers 
a forum in which to advocate for and protect democratic rights.71 Klein’s work re-
emphasizes the intertwined relationship between the pursuit of the basic goods (here, 
democratic rights) and the fight against climate change.  
 In wealthy and industrialized societies, democratic rights are less likely to be 
infringed upon in overt ways such as slavery or formal disenfranchisement, and instead 
are threatened by more invisible and insidious forces. Klein repeatedly exposes the 
privileging of corporate interests above the wellbeing of the citizenry in contemporary 
society. Legislation that protects the “rights” of corporations and industries, specifically 
Big Pharmaceuticals, Big Agriculture, and Big Oil directly undermines an individual’s 
participation power within a democracy while undercutting the idea that democracy is a 
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good in itself. 72 This consolidation and protection of corporate power actively blocks 
environmental interests and slows or weakens environmental policy and advocacy; as 
Klein notes, corporate wealth in the pharmaceutical, agricultural, oil, and chemical 
sectors funds think tanks that disseminate information to “disprove” climate change, 
empowers politicians that oppose abatement policies, and pays to lobby for more 
favorable corporate conditions.73 Thus action taken to protect democratic rights and 
freedoms against consolidated corporate power is also action taken to forward the fight 
against climate change.  
 A possible challenge is that I have ignored the costs of climate change abatement. 
Abatement from carbon may mean job loss, the destruction of local industry, and other 
truly burdensome economic costs. Further, it is overwhelmingly likely that already-
marginalized groups will bear these burdens far more than the wealthy and empowered. 
Yet it is not environmentalism itself that is responsible for the burdens borne by these 
groups – indeed, by calling for stronger communities, the protection of democratic rights, 
the careful inspection of our wants and needs, and the basic provision of our health and 
security, the fight against climate change calls also for the consideration and protection of 
the good life for all. By holding society at large responsible for making vast behavioral 
shifts, the fight against climate change creates many inconveniences as well as true 
losses. Yet it also forces us to reconsider our social priorities, not least of which is the 
ways in which marginalized peoples are impacted by or protected from the affects of 
climate change.   
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Neoclassicism and Environmentalism  
 There is no dearth of economic literature regarding environmental policy and 
climate change. Indeed, the policy instruments dearest to economic hearts (most notably, 
carbon taxation and cap-and-trade schemes) may be the most “effective” ways of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, incentivizing investment in sustainable technology, 
and generally curbing polluting behaviors on the part of both consumers and firms.74 
Surely such policies will only grow in importance as political action becomes more and 
more imperative, and economic analysis will remain a key tool in advancing these 
policies. Despite this role for economists, the tenets of neoclassicism and their 
implications for the ways in which we frame the problems we face are in many ways 
deeply damaging to environmentalism’s fundamental project.  
Many economists, perhaps most notably William Nordhaus, have devoted their 
careers to estimating the social benefits associated with carbon abatement, the risk and 
uncertainty surrounding climate change, the probabilities of certain costs being 
incurred.75 Such scholarship generates estimates that are integral in recommending policy 
for carbon abatement, without which potential support for such policies would be 
impossible. Yet the marginal cost-benefit analyses of carbon abatement that is central to 
this discussion, essentially a conversation of how urgently we need to give up a certain 
amount of carbon, reduces all the costs and benefits to one equitable metric and in doing 
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so reiterates the stubborn and myopic commitment to a binary interpretation of what is 
valuable, what is dangerous, what motivates our choices.  
Such an analysis weighs the burden of increased unemployment against the loss 
of life and property, compares the costs of disease to the foregone profits from shutting 
down firms, and generally ignores the inconveniently unquantifiable tragedies of lost 
biodiversity and natural beauty due to environmental degradation by relying on the 
assignment of dollar values. Again neoclassical economic practice is unable to make 
distinctions between what is intrinsically valuable – life, health, natural beauty, 
community, safety – and what is only instrumentally valuable – growth, wealth, property.  
Again neoclassical economic practice only considers what is convenient to measure, only 
factors in variables and quantities as long as they can be reduced to a dollar amount. 
Though economists are practiced in transforming the externalities of air quality, illness, 
forced migration, and so on into dollar amounts, something is lost in this act. More than 
just failing to capture completely the value of each of these intangibles, more than forcing 
economists to ignore the externalities that cannot be quantified no matter how 
momentous they may be, the practice of measuring intrinsic value against instruments 
like wealth and growth alienates us from our ability to define and pursue the inherently 
worthy aspects of our lives.  
The use of cost-benefit analyses to compare intrinsic goods against instrumental 
goods or hollow pursuits indiscriminately, a practice that is central to climate change 
economics, re-emphasizes the singular pursuit of surplus maximization. To reiterate a 
central and basic position, surplus maximization as the central goal, and the resulting 
alienation from what is inherently valuable, arise from the intertwined neoclassical 
 60 
concepts of scarcity and utility. One’s utility, unbounded by any reasonable 
understanding of what is needed, worthy, or enough, is measured only against how much 
utility one could have. From this naturally arises insatiability and scarcity, which can 
only be satisfied by more (synonymously, surplus production). Thus the way that 
neoclassical economics collapses any distinction between what is intrinsically valuable 
and what is only instrumentally valuable, hollow, or possibly even detrimental alienates 
us from our ability to identify and pursue the true aspects of a good life.  
These central pillars and their detrimental impacts on our understanding of 
wellbeing play out in the ways in which the environmental movement organizes itself and 
communicates its messages. To use two previously established terms, the distinction 
between deep and shallow environmentalism (in the vernacular, conservation and 
preservation, respectively) reflects the neoclassical framing of the problem of climate 
change. The two stances stand at the extremes of the divorce between human and nature: 
one suggests that nature is utterly separate from humanity and worthwhile outside of 
human appreciation, while the other values natural resources only insofar as they are 
useful to humanity and conserves them only to be used in the future. Unexpectedly, these 
seemingly polar opposites at the core of the environmental discussion together illustrate 
the internal contradictions of neoclassical thought. Deep environmentalism legitimizes 
itself by removing the human subject, invoking the same scientific tradition on which 
neoclassicism rests. Deep environmentalism’s insistence that “nature” exists outside of a 
human conception and is worthy of preservation outside of human valuation reflects the 
neoclassical commitment to disengaging from humanity so that its metric of value 
appears objective. Shallow environmentalism bases itself on utterly subjective values, 
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showing a blatant disregard for the distinction between instrumental and intrinsic value 
and reducing all value to the same metric of utility.  
The utilitarian practice of retaining objectivity through singular reliance on 
subjective and instrumental metrics characterizes the divide between preservationism and 
conservationism just as it characterizes neoclassical thought. To reiterate, both 
preservation environmentalism and neoclassicism legitimize themselves by gaining 
distance from the human subject. Meanwhile, both conservation environmentalism and 
neoclassicism only consider instrumental value, and in doing so ignore the intrinsic value 
of an individual’s relationship with her social and physical context. Nowhere in the 
neoclassical framing of environmentalism, shallow or deep, is there room for the self-
aware human subject and her relationship to “nature,” to the environment, to her own 
behaviors as they pertain to the central goals of environmentalism. This eclipse of 
environmentalism’s true project is a product of neoclassical economics’ general blindness 
to the self-aware, self-conscious, and socially oriented modern subject.   
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Conclusion 
Neoclassical economics is characterized by its commitment to a utilitarian understanding 
of human wellbeing as a metric of pain or pleasure. This polar arrangement of human 
experience gives rise to several implications for the neoclassical portrait of human 
functioning. First, in this conception, we exist in a constant state of insatiability and thus 
in a constant state of scarcity. Second, in the absence of any true inquiry about what 
comprises human wellbeing, surplus stands as a proxy for goodness, since insatiability 
can only ever be satisfied by more. Third, when the virtues of a good human life are 
measured along one two dimensional metric of magnitude and sign, there is no sensitivity 
to differences between goods or the treatment of some values as intrinsic and some values 
as instrumental.  
These three implications of neoclassical economics are damaging to the modern 
self-perception and the ability of the modern individual to define and pursue what is good 
in life. The portrait drawn by neoclassicism shows the human subject to be incapable of 
determining intrinsic worth, lacking in self-awareness, uncommitted to any ideal beyond 
personal pleasure, and unconnected to any social context. This portrait alienates us from 
the pursuit of what is intrinsically valuable while fostering a perpetual sense of 
dissatisfaction and desire for more. Further, under neoclassicism, the depth of the human 
subject is erased – in order to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the contemporary empiricist, 
neoclassical theory abandons those aspects of humanity that are “non-rational,” 
unpredictable, unquantifiable, or otherwise challenging to the base assumptions of the 
neoclassical model. Essentially, neoclassicism separates its model of human functioning 
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and behavior from a sincere engagement with human character in order to preserve the 
integrity of its own parsimonious theories. 
 The erasure of the human subject and the contradictory yet simultaneous 
blindness to intrinsic value plagues our framing of climate change and the environmental 
movement. This is most clearly evidenced in the polarization of environmentalism as 
preservationism or conservationism. By framing climate change problems using 
neoclassical models and assumptions, the trade-offs become flattened, and the most 
fundamental goals of environmentalism are ignored. Therefore the grip of neoclassical 
theory must be loosened, its assumptions challenged, its recommendations second-
guessed. It is crucial that we understand neoclassicism not as a science but as a technique 
born from social philosophy, rife with bias and weakened by its parsimonious and obtuse 
portrait of its subject.   
Environmentalism in the truest sense reaffirms the interconnectedness of 
humanity and nature, and centers on the good life by seeking to alter human behaviors so 
that they more accurately protect and pursue human wellbeing. Environmental pursuits 
are therefore intrinsically valuable, yet are also instrumentally linked to the basic goods. 
Health, security, and harmony with nature are indisputably reliant upon fighting climate 
change. Further, environmentalism both relies on and incentivizes the creation of leisure 
time by challenging the commitment to growth and wealth accumulation. Similarly, the 
fight against climate change is invigorated by the innovations and reorganizations of local 
communities and compels international cooperation and responsibility within the 
international community. Finally, by forcing us to reexamine social priorities and 
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organization, environmentalism offers us a new frontier on which to fight for democratic 
rights and human dignity in the contemporary era.  
 The sincere pursuit of the good life, then, includes a full awareness of 
environmental goals in the truest sense. By the same token, environmentalism is 
worthwhile because it offers a rare and powerful opportunity to restructure our societies, 
to challenge neoclassical portraits of human functioning, and to reimagine our own 
wellbeing.   
 The threat of climate change stands as a powerful challenge to our commitment to 
wealth accumulation and points to the flaws in our social organization. The fight against 
climate change comes with immense tradeoffs, but these tradeoffs themselves are 
powerful forces in our pursuit of the good life because they demand that we think about 
what is truly important and what would be liberating to let go of. Environmentalism in its 
truest form demands a distinction between what is intrinsically worthwhile and what is 
only instrumental or empty of value. It asks us to turn away from the flat neoclassical 
understanding of worth. It asks us to embrace the opportunity to reimagine our selves, our 
communities, and our own good lives.    
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